Coercive Cooperation e-bog
546,47 DKK
(inkl. moms 683,09 DKK)
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and...
E-bog
546,47 DKK
Forlag
Princeton University Press
Udgivet
9 marts 2021
Længde
324 sider
Genrer
Central / national / federal government policies
Sprog
English
Format
epub
Beskyttelse
LCP
ISBN
9780691227825
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "e;sender"e; to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.