When Governments Lobby Governments (e-bog) af Zhang, Youlang
Zhang, Youlang (forfatter)

When Governments Lobby Governments e-bog

165,78 DKK (inkl. moms 207,22 DKK)
Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments, too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. ...
E-bog 165,78 DKK
Forfattere Zhang, Youlang (forfatter)
Udgivet 7 december 2022
Genrer Central / national / federal government policies
Sprog English
Format pdf
Beskyttelse LCP
ISBN 9781009117890
Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments, too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation.