Governing Uranium in the United States (e-bog) af Greenberg, Jacob
Greenberg, Jacob

Governing Uranium in the United States e-bog

436,85 DKK
As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its ';front-end' uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichm…
As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its ';front-end' uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment. Topics include prudent management practices, export-import controls, transportation, physical protection, and material accounting. The report highlights security analysis on uranium mining, milling, and conversion, which have historically enjoyed less proliferation scrutiny than other components of the nuclear fuel cycle.
E-bog 436,85 DKK
Forfattere Greenberg, Jacob (forfatter)
Udgivet 25.03.2014
Længde 84 sider
Genrer International relations
Sprog English
Format epub
Beskyttelse LCP
ISBN 9781442228184

As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its ';front-end' uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment. Topics include prudent management practices, export-import controls, transportation, physical protection, and material accounting. The report highlights security analysis on uranium mining, milling, and conversion, which have historically enjoyed less proliferation scrutiny than other components of the nuclear fuel cycle.