Can Theories be Refuted? (e-bog) af -
Harding, Sandra (redaktør)

Can Theories be Refuted? e-bog

2190,77 DKK (inkl. moms 2738,46 DKK)
According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex- perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'cr...
E-bog 2190,77 DKK
Forfattere Harding, Sandra (redaktør)
Forlag Springer
Udgivet 6 december 2012
Genrer Philosophy of science
Sprog English
Format pdf
Beskyttelse LCP
ISBN 9789401018630
According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex- perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri- cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "e;our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi- vidually but only as a corporate body"e;. Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra- tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.